Introduction
Foreign aid, especially official development assistance (ODA), has received increas ing criticism in past decades. In particular, it has been put into question if and to what extent aid can help foster the aims for which it has been paid. In most cases, it seems that there is no discernable effect or even a negative effect of ODA on economic development (Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2009) . It also appears that this result has long been known in both the donor and recipient countries. Nevertheless, the demand and supply of ODA is still high. The public choice literature on the determinants of ODA has revealed mainly political and strategic reasons for dis tributing foreign aid (Vaubel, 1991; Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele, 2008) rather than being based on economic need.
Another reason for aid ineffectiveness may be seen in a lack of good governance on the side of the recipients. Some have argued that aid should concentrate more on creating better institutions and fostering democracy (Nielsen and Nielson, 2008) although others are pessimistic about such prospects (Shirley, 2008) . Scully (1992) asserts that better institutions in the form of freer markets, respect for property rights, and more democracy, enhance economic welfare through higher growth and more equal distribution of income and wealth. Aid used to develop the institutional framework can help pave the way to higher aid effectiveness (Hodler, 2007) .
The United States has slowly and cautiously acknowledged these problems. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was established by President John F. Kennedy's Executive Order on November 3, 1961 as part of the Foreign Assistance Act passed earlier in the year by Congress. Creation of USAID marked a shift in US aid policy as it refocused aid efforts on long-term development goals instead of on military security and stability programs that had taken the place of the Marshall Plan upon its expiration. Today USAID is the major source of the United States' aid funding to countries across the globe as it seeks to promote economic development and democratization, as well as to help with disaster recovery. According to its website, USAID "has always had the twofold purpose of furthering America's foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and free markets while improving the lives of the citizens of the developing world.'"
The operating budget for USAID has grown considerably over time, topping $1 billion for the first time in FY 2009 (Congressional Budget Office, 2010 .
While the aid-growth relationship has been studied for decades, there is a rela tively new and growing literature on aid effectiveness with respect to bolstering democratic institutions. In this study we aim at contributing to this infancy literature by assessing ways by which ODA can help foster democratization or maintain ex isting democracy. For this purpose, we analyze US aid flows to countries of Eastern Europe and Eurasia from 1998 to 2007 with a particular emphasis on their effects on democracy, measured by a number of political freedoms indicators developed by Freedom House specifically for this region. This period is of interest as most of the observed 26 countries had made their major transitions before 1998 and were in a period of strengthening or weakening again their democratic institutions. Vested interests put under pressure by the transition process disappeared in the first few years, but re-evolved again later endangering the new democratic policies (where they existed). At the same time, the US refocused their aid objectives and started to put more emphasis on political objectives such as democratization. With the renewed emphasis from USAID on democratization, in particular toward the transi tion economies, it is useful to determine how successful these programs have been. Brown (2009) is highly critical of USAID's self-evaluation process, especially re garding Eastern Europe. He argues that agents care more about promoting a positive image of USAID rather than truly investigating how successful aid programs have been. Using Freedom House Nations in Transit data, we find that in simple linear regressions aid has generally not been a significant factor in a country's overall democracy score. However, aid has significantly contributed to several components of the democracy score, namely, civil society, electoral process, judicial framework, and media independence. Aid has not been significantly related to corruption or http://transition.usaid.gov/faqs.html. JITE 168 governance. Finally, the impact of aid is found to depend on the number of years of past central planning. Countries having less than 50 years of central planning had a significantly negative association to aid, whereas countries with more than 65 years of central planning benefited from greater aid.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section is dedicated to a brief review on the literature regarding aid and institutions. In section 3 we discuss different channels through which the US aid can affect democratization in transition economies. The data and methodology used to test these hypotheses are described in section 4. Findings from the empirical analyses are discussed and interpreted in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
The Literature
The literature on aid effectiveness is vast. However, Wichmann Christensen, Doucou liagos, and Paldam (2010) document this literature and show that it is dealing mainly with the effects of ODA on savings, investment, and economic growth. Much less attention has been paid to institutions. Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008) find that on average there is not a positive effect of aid on economic development,2 although this does not exclude individual successes. In particular, the evidence looks better for aid if it is incorporated in institutional analyses (see below). This suggests that aid is not the primary driver of economic development. It may, however, be an indirect driver through institutional reform. In what follows, we briefly discuss the institutions literature.
A first step is to acknowledge that democracies are better equipped to enhance economic growth because the encompassing interest of an elected government in the well-being of the citizens is higher than the interest of an autocrat (Olson, 1991) . This does not imply that democratic governments are benevolent; they have their own interests which can deviate from overall welfare aspects. Nevertheless, democratic governments are expected to increase social welfare in comparison to autocratic governments. This proposition has been tested empirically. One of the first papers3 to test this relationship is Barro (1996) . His results for a sample of about 100 countries show a non-linear relation; increasing political rights improve growth at the margin but growth peaks prior to maximal freedom. His explanation is that beyond some point a more expansive democracy allows for more rent-seeking and income redistribution which retards economic growth. Barro also makes clear that this is not a causal relationship, as higher standards of living may encourage political liberalization.
In analyses of the transition countries, several papers cluster around the questions raised by Barro (1996) . The result of reversed causality that growth leads to reforms is supported by Krueger and Ciolko (1998) . They suggest that political liberalization can be endogenous to output decline directly after the beginning of transformation.
2 This result has been confirmed for Eastern Europe by Bhandari et al. (2007) . 3 An earlier survey is given by Sirowy and Inkeles (1990) . De Melo, Denizer, and Gelb (1996) analyze the positive effects of economic lib eralization on price stability and economic growth with the help of a self-created reform index. Fidrmuc (2003) focuses on the relation between democratization and economic liberalization in transition economies. Without liberalization, the ef fects of democratization on growth remained small. Heckelman (2010a) shows that broad democracy indexes created by Freedom House are positively correlated with economic growth in transition economies, but the effects can differ by democracy category. Apolte (2010) also shows that an increase in the level of democracy in transition economies turns out to be growth enhancing. Further, the estimated effect is stronger the lower is the initial level of democracy. This result is supported by earlier work from Falcetti, Raiser, and Sanfey (2002) , who also show that the effect of reforms on growth depends heavily on initial conditions. Next we proceed to the literature on aid and democratic reforms, which is rarely restricted to transition economies. Several papers find no effect of aid on growth conditional on institutions in developing countries. For example, Alvi, Mukheijee, and Shukralla (2008a) cannot identify a significant role of aid in the relation between reform and growth. However, they did not estimate a direct effect of aid on reform, but rather a multivariate regression on growth, including both aid and reform as potential determinants. They find that aid is insignificant. Economides, Kalyvitis, and Philippopoulos (2008) conclude that aid benefits growth overall but the positive contribution from aid is largely off-set through rent-seeking activities, and the harm is greater the larger is the size of the recipient government. Murphy and Tresp (2006) find little support for the argument that aid is growth enhancing even when the institutional setting is favorable.
By contrast to the dismissive results, there is some support for the hypothesis that aid can affect growth in combination with political reform processes. Alvi, Mukheijee, and Shukralla (2008b) in a second paper on almost 50 developing countries, find a small positive effect of aid in a joint estimation of aid and institutions on growth. The returns from aid are diminishing and their overall judgment is still cautious and does not assign a high influence to aid. In a similar analysis for about 100 developing countries, Svensson (1999) shows that aid in combination with good governance supports economic growth. Yet, in the absence of mechanisms to control the government, aid is found to be abused for unproductive purposes, as suggested in theory by Landau (1990) .
Some studies deal explicitly with transition economies and the effect of aid on growth and policy reform respectively. One paper in particular replicates the positive effects of aid on growth when institutions are favorable, which have been shown for developing countries. In a panel estimation for 20 transition countries, Cungu and Swinnen (2003) show that the annual growth rate depends positively on aid and liberalization, and the effectiveness of aid is enhanced in more liberalized economies.
A small but growing number of papers discuss the role aid plays directly for reforms. Most focus on economic rather than political freedoms. De Haan and Sturm (2003) analyze the effect of political reform on economic freedom, which is positive JITE 168 and significant for a sample of about 70 developing countries. Aid adds to this effect only in very few equations. Heckelman and Knack (2008) find aid generally hinders economic reforms in a similarly-sized sample, but has a positive, albeit insignificant, coefficient when the time period is limited to the 1990s and further includes 17 additional countries, 13 of which are former Soviet bloc nations. This suggests aid may have been more effective for economic freedom among the nations of the former Soviet Union than for others. Metelska-Szaniawska (2009) estimates the effects of constitutional constraints on economic reforms in 20 transition economies. Although not the focus of her study, she does find aid to have a positive and significant effect on the reform process in these countries for half of the regressions. Regarding political reforms, Knack (2004) concludes that aid had no effect in a large sample of roughly 100 nations, using alternative measures of aid intensity and democracy indicators, whereas Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol (2008) find aid to be more harmful than the "resource curse" of oil production. In contrast, by focusing exclusively on 26 transition economies, Heckelman (2010b) finds that aid was supportive for political reform processes but only when aid was measured per capita, not per GDR Furthermore, aid did not have a significant impact on media independence, but was significantly correlated with changes in four other political freedom categories.
All these papers analyzed total ODA received by the countries. Individual donors may have conflicting goals and not all donors necessarily are even concerned with supporting democratization effects. In the following, we will estimate how one big donor country, the United States, and its aid policy affects the state of democracy in transition countries.
The Rationale of US Aid in Eurasia and EECs
To test how US aid is affecting the democratic development in the transition countries of Eastern Europe and Eurasia, we develop a central argument about the relation of aid and institutions, which takes into account the status of post-communist countries at the end of last century. This argument leads to two contradicting hypotheses.
In his State of the Union address in 1994, President Clinton referred to the promotion of democracy as the "third pillar" comprising his foreign policy agenda.
He emphasized the promotion of "sustainable development" as the new, post-Cold War strategy for the foreign aid programs funded by USAID. Economic assistance supported six inter-related goals: achievement of broad-based, economic growth; development of democratic systems; stabilization of world population and protection of human health; sustainable management of the environment; building human capacity through education and training; and meeting humanitarian needs. President Bush later modified these goals around what he referred to as the three "strategic pillars" of (1) economic growth, agriculture, and trade; (2) global health; and (3) democracy, conflict prevention, and humanitarian assistance. While most of these focus on long range institutional capacity, humanitarian aid is usually offered after specific traumatic experiences, such as the recent flooding in Moldova.
Democracy and governance promotion was not originally a major focus for USAID funding; however, the amount of money devoted to these programs in recent years has expanded significantly. Thomas Carothers acknowledges that the inclusion of democratization efforts into an agency fundamentally committed to socioeconomic development abroad was "hesitant [...] [and] awkward" (Carothers, 2009, p. 14) . In the past 20 years, though, democracy promotion has become a pillar of USAID's mission and the funding for democracy and governance has steadily increased.
The transition economies received special attention upon the fall of the Soviet Union. Two new aid programs were funded through USAID. The SEED (Support for East European Democracy Act of 1989) and the FREEDOM Support Act (Free dom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992) programs were designed to assist Eastern European and newly in dependent former Soviet Union (FSU) states develop democratic institutions and foster free market economies. In FY 2004, SEED countries were allocated $440 million while the FSU received almost $600 million in appropriated funds. Analysis of USAID's budget has shown the proportion of aid devoted to democratization in particular has almost doubled from 7.5% in 1990 to 12.3% by 2005, with the largest regional support going to the transition economies of Europe and Eurasia, collectively accounting for $2.7 billion in real 2000 values over this period (Azpuru et al., 2008) .
As the focus of our analyses is on the recipient countries and the effect of US aid on their democracy and political institutions,4 the main theoretical line of reasoning is that foreign official development aid can function as an indirect trigger to development in an environment of democratization and the further strengthening of democracy. Aid is both a resource to improve institutions and a means to overcome vested interests opposing further institution building. The first argument treats ODA as a means to shift the political budget constraint outwards. The government has more financial options to build up better public institutions, buy political support for more individual freedom or fund private activities directly.
For the transition nations in particular, the resistance of vested interests to democ ratization and liberalization may be substantial and even increase after the initial shock in the early 1990s. The start of the transition at the beginning 1990s can well be interpreted as an Olsonian-type shock (Olson, 1982) , destroying the power of vested interests. These interests were organized again or new interest groups formed in the period after 1990 respectively. Such a reformation of lobbies may 4 Aid allocations may be determined by various factors, including to which coun tries aid might be thought to be most effective, assistance in fighting terrorism, or re warding support of other US policies in international forums such as the UN Security Council. Our interest is not in determining the cause of aid but rather its effect. How ever, we note that if aid is distributed based on past success, there may be an upward bias in our findings which is further discussed below. Typically, though, aid decisions pre-date allocations (and are often part of a multi-year package) which lessen concerns regarding potential endogeneity when using annual data, as we do here. JITE 168 well keep the democratization process at bay (and even reverse former successes).
Aid in this interpretation can help to support democratization further. Aid critics might suggest that in countries where democratization is already well underway, less scope for further improvements and therefore less chance for USAID to positively affect democratic structures exist. In this sense, aid to transition economies would be wasted for the purpose of assisting democratization. Yet, as will be shown below, the level of democratization in many transition economies is still remarkably low and has even reversed a bit in the last few years. Those countries that already had the strongest democratic institutions at the start of our sample date have meanwhile grown out of the need for aid and become EU members. In our empirical work, we control for the initial level of democratization to determine the marginal impact of aid, and include in our main samples nations that graduated from being aid recipients as a further control. We find that limiting the sample to only those nations which received aid in every year does not alter our initial conclusions.
The view that foreign aid is helpful with respect to democratization is in line with Vaubel's (1991) dirty-work-hypothesis: external support increases the chances of the domestic government to pursue a policy reform. In the case of our study, the reform is an institutional one. The dirty work done by external forces is to build up and (as in our sample) maintain a structure. This can be done by strengthening all sorts of democratic forces, e.g., the civil society and the media. A strong civil society, a functioning education system, and media as the fourth power in a democracy may well enhance a reform process (Freytag and Renaud, 2007) .
Thus, the first hypothesis is that US aid to transition countries enhances democ racy. This takes place through the quality of the electoral process, the expansion of civil society, and improved transparency, which can be measured as judicial and media independence, governance, and limiting corruption. We also would expect that aid directed at specific democratic institutions such as press freedom and the like has a rather significant leverage effect. Even small amounts of aid can have a high marginal positive effect to support the drafting and enforcement of such institutions, or to buy off certain key opponents.
Tests performed by Fidrmuc (2003) suggest that the effect of democratization on growth is greater in an initial transition period than in later years, such as the decade we analyze (1998 through 2007). We also would expect that countries which have already developed to a certain extent are less dependent on aid to foster democratization. In case of current European Union members, this can be seen in Table 1 , which shows that USAID has concentrated much more heavily on non-EU members; they receive on average over $10 per capita aid whereas the eventual EU members received on average less than $1 per capita aid. In fact, most of the latter group stopped receiving any assistance from USAID at some point during our sample period.5 These low-(or no-)aid countries serve as a useful control but as shown below, our initial results are robust to their exclusion.
For some countries, this occurred prior to official membership. In addition to this qualification, there is a counter-hypothesis. In a process of democratization in post-Soviet-type society, aid may also prove to be an obstacle to institutional improvements. Government officials may abuse the funds, in particular if they are focused on staying in power and using the power to generate their own income, want to buy political support from rent-seeking groups, or are able to corruptly pay off reformers. In such a setting, the effectiveness of aid may be reduced.
If the use of ODA is difficult to control for the donor, aid inflows may constitute a means for the ruling elite to weaken or even reverse democracy, governance, and transparency. In particular in transition countries where the government already has ruled for a long time, the willingness to allow for more political competition may decrease; examples include Belarus, the Ukraine, or the Russian Federation. Thus, the alternative hypothesis is that US aid granted to transition economics is adverse to more democratic freedom. This allows for analyses to be conducted on the separate types of political freedom used to measure overall levels of democracy. Aid may be more beneficial or harmful depending on the type of political freedom considered (Heckelman, 2010b) .
Based on a survey of country experts, Freedom House rates each nation in NIT on a scale from 1-77 for several categories which largely coincide with the "democracy building initiatives under SEED [which] have included support for free elections, nongovernmental organizations and civil society, independent media, transparent legal systems, anti-corruption measures, and local governance" (Cincotta, 2009, p. 5) . Formally, the NIT categories are represented by (with corresponding SEED terminology in parentheses):
Civil Society ("nongovernmental organizations and civil society") assesses the growth of nongovernmental organizations, their organizational capacity and finan cial sustainability, and the legal and political environment in which they function; the development of free trade unions; and interest group participation in the policy process.
Corruption8 ("anti-corruption measures ") looks at public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policy makers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy of anticorruption initiatives.
6 Fidrmuc uses the original Freedom House democracy index, which is the average of the associated political rights and civil liberties indexes.
7 Scores are assigned in quarter-point increments, effectively turning the 1-7 scale into a 25 point range.
8 The Corruption index begins in 1999. Governance ("local governance") considers the stability of the governmental sys tem; the authority of legislative bodies; decentralization of power; the responsibil ities, election, and management of local governmental bodies; and legislative and executive transparency.
Judicial Framework ("transparent legal systems") highlights constitutional reform, human rights protections, criminal code reform, judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantee of equality before the law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions.
Media Independence ("independent media") addresses the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of journalists, editorial independence, the emergence of a financially viable private press, and Internet access for private
citizens.
An overall democracy score is then computed as the average value across all cat egories. The average score represents a scale ranging from consolidated democracy to consolidated authoritarian regime. In 2008, eight of these nations had an average democracy score classifying them as consolidated democracies (all of which are new EU members), another eight were classified as consolidated authoritarian regimes (all of which are non-Baltic former Soviet states), and the remaining thirteen fell between these extremes. The overall democracy score assigned a country in NIT is JITE 168 highly correlated with the average value of its Political Rights and Civil Liberties scores (Heckelman, 2010a) , suggesting a strong consistency between the NIT index and the more popular, older indexes published by Freedom House. In these indexes, the numerical score represents a relative ranking, so smaller numbers correspond to a higher ranking. For example, 1 is the top ranking possible. To ease interpreta tion, we reverse the scale of the NIT index and each of its separate categories by subtracting it from 7. The inverted scores thus range from 0-6 where higher values now represent greater levels of democratic freedom.
The Figure shows the average (inverted) democracy score for the region over time. Depressingly, after an initial increase, the democracy score shows a steady decline. By the end of the sample period in 2007, democratization in the region appears to have fallen by roughly 8% from a high of 3.04 in 1999.
Control Variables
To explain the level of democracy, Fidrmuc (2003) includes as potential determi nants the lagged value of the democracy index, the lagged value of an economic liberalization index created by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop ment (ERBD), the log of real per capita GDP, the growth rate of the previous year, and an alternating series of proxies designed to capture western or Russian influ ence.9 We include each of these in our specifications. The EBRD transition index (taken from the EBRD website) represents the average of 14 separate categories, ranging from 1 to 4.33, with 1 representing the least liberalized state. GDP data are taken from The World Bank World Development Indicators database. As influence measures, Fidrmuc considered in separate regressions the distance of a nation's capital to EU-headquarters in Brussels,10 a dummy for Former Soviet Union, or the number of years of past central planning.11 The liberalization index and GDP vari ables are expected to positively influence democratization, whereas the influence variables (as measured) are expected to reduce democratization.
Aid
To Fidrmuc's base specifications we add our key variable of interest, the amount of per capita aid received through USAID. Following the convention in the literature on (global) aid, our measure is based on all aid received through USAID although it may be useful to separate between funds dedicated to democracy and governance 9 Fidrmuc also found a dummy for war years to be negative and significant but none of the countries were at war during our sample period.
10 Specific distances are not available for Tajikstan, Turkmenistan, or Uzbekistan. Fidrmuc estimates these as 6000 km, well in excess of the next furthest nation (Azer baijan =4321 km). We adopt Fidrmuc's estimates. Our distance variable is measured in thousands of km.
11 The three influence measures are highly correlated. The 15 FSU nations are on average 2100 km further from Brussels and experienced almost 20 additional years of central planning, compared to the remaining 11 non-FSU nations. versus other ODA (Azpuru et al., 2008) . However, any earmarked ODA can usually be easily redirected. There is also the difficulty in consistently identifying particular programs over several years. Thus earmarked ODA is likely to be a noisier signal for institutional support than using the full amount of ODA received. In our regressions, USAID levels are normalized to per capita terms. We seek to determine if funds from USAID have been helpful or harmful to subsequent democratization when controlling for the factors listed above.
Empirical Results
Our sample includes all 25 countries considered by Fidrmuc plus the country of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The other three countries currently included in NIT, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia, were grouped together as Yugoslavia until 2004.
They are not included in our sample. Following Fidrmuc, our regressions are based on pooled annual data with the value of a democracy index as the dependent variable.
We utilize OLS with panel corrected standard errors clustered by country. Due to the potential endogeneity of aid, we also considered the possibility of IV estimation, but valid instruments are difficult to discover and the bias from weak instruments is typically worse than from OLS. For example, Knack (2004) uses population, infant mortality, and colonial heritage dummies to instrument for aid over a twenty-five year period in a pure cross-section format. These variables would have little to no time-series variation and thus would not help explain annual aid disbursements.
Our sample runs from [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . Because not all countries received aid, as ro bustness checks on our initial regressions we also consider reduced samples which drop no-or low-aid countries. In addition, we also separately consider the under lying categories comprising the democracy index. In those regressions, the lagged democracy score represents only that particular category. Because some countries received the lowest possible ranking on individual categories, where necessary we check the OLS estimates against Tobit estimates. Descriptive statistics on the full sample for all variables are presented in Table 2 .
Initial Regressions
Estimates from the base specifications using the full sample appear in the first three columns of Table 3 . Each of the control variables generates the expected sign, except for the liberalization index, although none are statistically significant except for the lagged democracy score and two of the influence measures. The lagged democracy coefficient is less than 1.0, consistent with the previous Figure showing a reduction over time. However, the coefficient is only statistically significantly less than 1.0 when controlling for previous years of central planning in column (3) .12 This regression suggests that, controlling for the other factors, a nation is only estimated to retain 95% of its previous democracy index score from one year 12 P-values are 0.29, 0.31, and 0.00 for columns (1)-(3) respectively. to the next. Regarding the influence proxies, FSU nations were just over one-tenth of a point lower on the index scale (approximately 4% of the sample mean), even controlling for the previous year's score. FSU nations also experienced, on average, 20 additional years of central planning. Estimates from column (3) suggest that these extra 20 years reduced the democracy score by approximately 0.16 points (6% of the mean score). Distance from Brussels (column (1)) was not a statistically significant factor. We also ran additional regressions adding an EU dummy to each specification. The dummy took the value of 1 for EU membership years (starting in either 2004 or 2007 -see Table 1 ). This variable was never statistically significant, and its inclusion did not affect the other estimates.
Our key variable of interest, of course, is the aid measure. Although generating a positive coefficient, the marginal impact is miniscule and not statistically signifi cant at conventional levels in any of the regressions. If aid distributions are used to reward improving democracies, the estimated aid coefficient would be biased upward, reinforcing our initial conclusion that aid has not benefitted the democrati zation process. We also ran additional regressions replacing aid by its lagged value.
The coefficient was negative but had p-values ranging from 0.86-0.94 and none of the other variable coefficients were appreciably affected, so we still conclude from these regressions that aid did not have a substantive effect.
During the sample period, Czech Republic, Estonia, and Slovenia basically did not receive any aid.13 Their inclusion represents a control if they are able to maintain 13 Czech Republic did receive just over $200,000 worth of grants to support demo cratic reforms in one year (2002) . In the two surrounding years, the level of assis their political freedoms without the assistance from USAID. On the other hand, it may be of interest to limit the sample to actual aid recipient nations. Dropping these nations in columns (4)-(6) does not alter signs or significance for any variable coefficients except that the economic liberalization variable is now (just barely) significant at the 10% level when controlling for FSU status. The inverse correlation between liberalized markets and political freedoms is surprising but consistent with many of Fidrmuc's (2003) results. The three dropped nations scored relatively high on both the liberalization and democracy indexes, so their prior inclusion somewhat masked the potential conflict between openness in markets and democracy. Yet, the finding is not robust to any of the other specifications so we do not consider it to be of much importance.
Four other nations which had been receiving aid also "graduated" from USAID several years before the end of the sample period. These include Lithuania (2002), Latvia (2003) , Slovakia (2003), and Poland (2003) .14 As shown in the final three columns of Table 3 , dropping these four nations as well (making seven dropped total) does not affect any of the signs or significance levels from the full sample results reported in columns (l)-(3).
Even among the nations always receiving aid, Table 1 revealed substantial differ ences in aid levels. For example, Georgia received twice as much aid per person as Armenia, seven times as much as Croatia, 18 times as much as Ukraine, and more than sixty times as much as Belarus. If there is a threshold effect only after which aid becomes effective, then the relatively small amounts of aid given to some countries may drown out the positive impact from higher levels of aid. We test for this notion by using both aid and aid squared. Although the squared term coefficient was always positive, it never came close to achieving statistical significance. The results hold even when dropping those countries that received no aid or stopped receiving aid.
Effect of Aid by Democracy Category
The previous set of results does not support the idea that USAID has been instrumen tal in maintaining democratization among the EE and FSU nations. Yet, it still could be true that aid has been helpful for certain specific types of political freedoms, even if the overall democracy index is not affected. This notion is tested in Table 4 where the separate category scores replace the overall democracy index.15 Each regression controls for the same list of determinants as in Table 3 , but for brevity only the aid tance was less than $100,000 and recorded as 0.0 (in millions) in the USAID on-line database. Estonia and Slovenia did not receive any funding through USAID after 1997.
14 Poland did receive a relative pittance (just over a half-penny per person) in 2005. Hungary did not receive any aid only in the last two sample years.
15 In computing the Democracy score, Freedom House uses the average of these in dex scores so that all categories have 1/6 weight. Beginning in 2005, the Governance index was replaced by two separate indexes representing National Democratic Gover nance (NDG) and Local Democratic Governance (LDG) but uses the average of NDG and LDG to maintain 1/6 weight for Governance. For consistency, we also use the average of NDG and LDG to continue the Governance series. Aid always generates a positive coefficient, except for Governance. Whether positive or negative, the effect of aid on Governance is nowhere close to significant.
Aid is always positively correlated with freedom from Corruption, but again is never significant. Aid does, however, appear to significantly affect the Judicial index, although the significance levels are much weaker under Tobit, especially when controlling for distance or FSU status. For Media, aid loses its significance from OLS when estimated by Tobit except when controlling for years of central planning.
Finally, aid is significantly related to the Civil Society and Electoral indexes in each specification under both estimation routines.
In sum, results for aid are robust to the choice of influence proxy when using OLS, but somewhat sensitive under Tobit. Significance levels are also generally weakened under Tobit, indicating the OLS coefficient estimates may be biased upward, giving too much credit to aid. Still, aid is positively and significantly correlated with Civil Society, Electoral, Judicial, and Media, but only the first two are robust.
Also of note is that each of the influence proxies are themselves always negatively correlated with each category score (not shown in the table). As was reported for the overall democracy score, years of central planning consistently achieves the strongest p-values. The FSU dummy is also statistically significant in each case except for Media. Thus, former Soviet republics do not have less media freedom, on average, at the margin, than the rest of the sample of Eastern European nations.
However, being further from Brussels does result in significantly less media freedom, but surprisingly this is found only under Tobit estimation. The same is true for Civil Society, Governance, and Electoral. Distance is statistically significant when estimated by OLS for Judicial and Corruption.
Non-Linear Effects from Aid
The effectiveness of aid may also depend on how critical is external support for the maintenance of democratization. That is, where political freedoms are least likely to be protected or nurtured by the domestic central governments when left on their own. To test this idea, we interact aid with the influence measures. Coefficients for the interaction terms would be expected to be positive, indicating that the importance of aid would increase the greater (lesser) the natural Eastern (Western) influence which occurs in the absence of aid. Results are reported in Table 5 .
Interaction terms between aid and distance, and aid and FSU are not statistically presence of political freedoms, in the absence of aid. The coefficient on aid by itself is also negative and significant suggesting that aid would retard democratization in a hypothetical nation which had never been subject to central planning. Of course, no such country exists in our sample exclusive to transition nations. But the positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term reveals that the harm from aid is mitigated the longer the country had been centrally planned. Notes: Net effect = 0 when number of years = 60.9 years. Marginal impact represents one standard-deviation change in aid per capita. Calculations based on estimates from column (3) in Table 5 .
In Table 6 we report on the marginal impact of a one-standard-deviation change in aid per capita, for various levels of years of central planning. Czech Republic and Slovakia had the fewest years of central planning in the sample, and a one-standard deviation increase in aid ($13.4 per capita) would reduce the democracy scores of such countries by about 0.08, or 3% of the mean democracy score. Thankfully, the Czech Republic never received more than a half-penny per person in any given year, and aid to Slovakia ended halfway through the sample, suggesting the harmful impact of US AID throughout the period was much less in these countries than it otherwise might have been. Our estimates suggest the harm from aid is not eliminated until a country had undergone at least 61 years of central planning. As reported in the second row, the countries in our sample coming closest without exceeding that threshold had only 47 years of central planning history. These eight nations also represent the median number of years of central planning. For these nations, a one-standard-deviation increase in aid represents a roughly 2% decline in the democracy index, which is still statistically significant at better than 10% level.
Although the median countries were harmed by aid, a hypothetical nation at the mean number of years of central planning (55.5) would not be significantly affected by aid. The countries closest to the aid turning point of 61 years of central planning, identified in the next to last row, saw a small positive benefit from their aid after having previously undergone 67 years of central planning. Yet this effect is quite small; a one-standard-deviation increase in aid represents less than a 1% higher democracy rating. At the high end, Russia would be estimated to have benefited the most from USAID, with a one-standard-deviation increase yielding a 1.7% higher democracy score.
Thus, the impact of USAID is decidedly mixed. A majority of countries (15) In this paper we assess the effects of development assistance on democratic in stitutions in recipient countries. Our study sheds some light on the role of aid in building and in defending democratization. We find that despite assistance from USAID, Eurasian and Eastern European countries are generally unable to maintain and improve their democratic environment in the years after 1998. The positive influence of US aid has mainly been limited to judicial framework, civil society, media independence, and electoral processes, but US aid does not significantly affect governance and corruption. The first three categories are treated within the Freedom
House taxonomy as components of civil liberties, whereas the remaining categories are indicative of various political rights. We also find that democratic freedoms are more strongly affected by aid if the recipient country suffered longer from central planning.
In countries where central planning ended the longest time ago, aid is not helpful. Some have argued that focusing development aid on democratization and institutional capacity building is necessary before directing aid flows into economic activity, because this sort of aid has been revealed to be growth enhancing, if at all, only in countries with better institutional settings. Thus, one modest lesson from the study can be that aid donors should concentrate aid flows on countries with low civil liberties and a longer history of central planning.
Additional research would be helpful in explaining why support from USAID has been more successful in the areas of judicial independence, civil society, media freedom, and electoral process, than in corruption and governance. This may re quire alternative methodologies, such as case studies on individual countries which have had varying degrees of success. Our study has shown USAID can help foster democratization in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, but only for certain types of polit ical freedoms which are not revealed when using an aggregated index. It would be useful, then, to replicate this study for other parts of the world once enough years 
